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As baby boomers enter retirement and age, it is likely that end-of-life issues will gain 
greater and greater public attention. Several recent articles reflect on these issues. 
In “Making Christian Life and Death Decisions,” Rev. Kevin Flannery, SJ, of the 
Gregorian University, offers a helpful look at end-of-life issues such as euthanasia, 
artificial nutrition and hydration, and life-sustaining treatments, making use of the 
teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas takes up the topic of acts of omission 
in Summa theologiae, where he asks “whether there can be voluntariness without 
any act” (I-II q. 6, a. 3). Aquinas’s account is relevant in deciding whether the act 
of omitting life-saving treatment is morally permissible. He holds that an omission 
of an act is voluntary (in an indirect sense) when the agent can and ought to act but 
does not act. If an agent can act and ought to act, he can be blamed for an omission 
to act. On the other hand, if an agent either does not have it in his power to act or 
could act but has no moral duty to perform the act, then the omission is not attributed 
to the agent as blameworthy. 
Flannery also calls to our attention the distinction between positive precepts 
(which bind always but not at every moment) and negative precepts (which bind 
always and at every moment). Aquinas provides an example of a positive precept: 
“Human beings . . . are always obliged to honor their parents when they ought to,” 
which implicitly suggests that there are also some times during which it is not proper 
to perform an act of honoring parents.1 Negative precepts, such as “Do not intention-
ally kill an innocent human being,” bind always and at every moment because there 
is no time in which it is permissible to intentionally kill an innocent human being.2
1 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 2, a. 1, ad 11.
2 Kevin L. Flannery, “Making Christian Life and Death Decisions,” Christian Bioethics 
17.2 (2011): 142.
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The nature of precepts and the idea of a negligent omission are related. In con-
sidering which omissions are negligent, we must consider particular practices and 
the precepts governing these practices. Thus, when we turn to questions in medical 
ethics, we must consider the nature of medicine as a practice. “At its definitional 
core,” writes Flannery, “medicine consists of physical acts aimed at (1) promoting 
or protecting the health of the bodies of the persons who are the objects of those 
acts and (2) removing from those bodies (as best it can) diseases and other maladies. 
Thus, an abortion is not a medical procedure since it does not promote or protect 
but rather destroys the health of the body of the human being that falls under the 
scalpel (or under the suction hose or whatever); but removing a cancerous uterus is 
a proper medical procedure.” 3 Given the nature of medicine, a doctor would violate 
this practice if the doctor intentionally performed an act in order to undermine 
someone’s health, but what about acts of omission?
On the basis given above, Flannery explores when an act may be licitly omitted 
by the medical doctor, for the positive precept of promoting health does not apply at 
every moment. He also addresses ways in which the Thomistic understanding that 
he develops applies to disputed cases in medical ethics, such as the administration 
of artificial nutrition and hydration and how this case is alike but also differs from 
making use of a ventilator. 
Flannery also writes that the doctor’s “primary responsibility is to promote and 
protect the health of his patient. Of course, he has no responsibility to respect the 
wishes—or presumed wishes—of the patient himself to forgo that which is genuinely 
called for medically: procedures he knows, in his position as ‘first mate’ to health, 
are called for.” 4 I wonder whether this statement should be qualified a bit more. It is 
true that the doctor as doctor has no responsibility to respect the wishes of the patient 
as patient in terms of requests for particular medical treatments. It is the doctor’s 
responsibility, not the patient’s, to determine which treatments are medically effec-
tive in relieving particular diseases. A patient as patient does not have competency 
in medical matters. But the doctor does have a responsibility to respect the wishes 
of the patient in forgoing what is called for medically. If a patient does not consent 
to a particular treatment, even if that treatment is medically indicated, the doctor 
should not force the treatment on an unwilling patient. Ethically (and legally), if a 
patient is mentally competent and refuses to give informed consent for a treatment, 
that treatment should not be administered. 
Michael Cholbi’s article “The Duty to Die and the Burdensomeness of Liv-
ing” takes up the idea of the duty to die, understood as an obligation to intentionally 
kill oneself. It also treats the idea that if someone has a duty to die, it is ethically 
permissible for other people to take the life of someone who has a duty to die but 
is negligent in carrying out this suicidal obligation. The justification for this idea is 
that, in some cases, one person’s continuing to live is burdensome for others, such 
that, it is unfair to these other people to continue to live.
3 Ibid., 143.
4 Ibid., 145.
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Cholbi gives the example of Captain Lawrence Oates, a member of an expedi-
tionary team to the South Pole in 1912. As Oates became weaker on the journey, he 
became more burdensome for the rest of the expeditionary team whose lives became 
endangered. Oates was unable to keep pace, but his colleagues did not want to leave 
him behind. One evening, Oates told his companions, “I am just going outside and 
may be some time.” 5 He walked out and never returned. Despite Oates’s attempt to 
help his colleagues, the rest of the expeditionary team eventually died also. Cholbi 
accepts the claim that Oates had a duty to die, and then ponders whether a duty to 
die also exists for people at the end of life who have become burdensome. 
While we do have obligations not to impose unfair burdens upon others, I would 
challenge the presupposition of Cholbi’s essay. Oates did not in fact impose burdens 
on others. Rather, the expeditionary team accepted the burden themselves. The lead 
of the expeditionary team could have said to Oates, “We are so sorry, but it is clear 
that if we slow our progress enough to include you, we will all die. In order to save 
the lives of the rest of our expeditionary team, we will have to move much more 
quickly, and since you are incapable of doing this, you will be left behind.” It would 
have been morally permissible to make this decision, a decision to let die, which is 
not the same as the decision to intentionally kill. If Oates had replied, “No, I insist 
that you take me with you, even though my slow progress will end up leading to 
all of our deaths,” such a reply would be selfish, unreasonable, and rightly rejected. 
But this is not what took place at all. Similarly, it can be selfish, unreasonable, and 
unfair of a person at the end of life to disproportionately consume resources at the 
expense of others. But this does not give rise to a “duty to die.” Rather, it gives rise 
to a duty to decline extraordinary means of prolonging life which, as a side effect 
that is accepted but not intended, may lead to death. 
In “A Costly Separation between Withdrawing and Withholding Treatment 
in Intensive Care,” Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu consider objections 
to the Equivalence Thesis, which is: “If it is ethical to withhold treatment, it would 
be ethical to withdraw the same treatment.” 6 Wilkinson and Savulescu note that 
most philosophers, bioethicists, legal guidelines, and professional standards endorse 
this thesis, and yet most physicians in practice do not. Some of the arguments for 
the Equivalence Thesis, surveyed by Wilkinson and Savulescu, are stronger than 
others: 
If it is not in his best interests to provide treatment, the doctor appears just as 
justified in a decision to withhold treatment as in one to withdraw treatment. 
Conversely, if it were actually in Mr W’s interests to receive treatment, then 
it would be just as wrong to withdraw treatment as to withhold it. Impor-
tantly, there are no necessary differences in the intentions of the doctor who 
withholds treatment compared to the one who withdraws it, no differences 
in consequences for the patient, no differences in the ultimate cause of their 
5 Michael Cholbi, “The Duty to Die and the Burdensomeness of Living,” Bioethics 
24.8 (October 2010): 415.
6 Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu, “A Costly Separation between Withdrawing 
and Withholding Treatment in Intensive Care,” Bioethics 28.3 (March 2014): 127.
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death, nor any difference in the moral responsibility of the doctor for his or 
her decision.7 
Wilkinson and Savulescu also provide several reasons why the Equivalence Thesis 
might not be correct, at least in situations in which resource allocation is an impor-
tant consideration. Given the expense of health care, it is difficult to conceive of a 
plausible and realistic scenario in which judicious use of resources is not a morally 
relevant consideration. 
First, one consideration raised by Wilkinson and Savulescu is the “first come, 
first served” principle. Even though others might benefit if treatment was withdrawn 
and given to others, those who are treated first, in virtue of being first, should not be 
put at a disadvantage. This principle treats all patients fairly, is unambiguous, easy 
to apply, and avoids biases that could prejudice other kinds of judgments. 
Second, a rejection of the Equivalence Thesis could lead to conflicts of inter-
est. If a doctor is seeing one patient but is aware that another potential patient could 
benefit if treatment is removed, the doctor’s duty to care for one patient would be 
put at cross purposes with the other potential patient. Medical professionals should 
not shoulder the additional responsibility of acting as triage officers at the bedside. 
Third, they raise a slippery slope concern. Wilkinson and Savulescu write,
For example, if doctors were allowed to stop life-prolonging treatment because 
another patient would have a greater chance of benefit, this might allow doctors 
to discriminate, consciously or subconsciously, on the basis of race, gender, 
age or disability. Alternatively, it might lead doctors to seek to actively end 
the lives of patients with a lower chance of survival, or a lower predicted 
quality of life than other existing or potential patients.8 
Fourth, there are differences of consent that justify a rejection of the Equiva-
lence Thesis. In order to discontinue treatment, consent from the person treated (or 
proxy consent if the person treated is not able to give consent) is needed in order 
to remove treatment. By contrast, if no treatment is offered, no consent is needed. 
Finally, legal vulnerability is also an issue. Medical professionals fear that 
withdrawing treatment in order to treat others may subject them to legal liability in 
ways in which simply not offering treatment would not. 
Wilkinson and Savulescu critically examine each of these five considerations, 
offering perhaps compelling objections to each, but it is unclear to me whether these 
counter-objections might not themselves be countered. For example, they note that 
a Rawlsian approach to fairness might end in an endorsement of the Equivalence 
Thesis, but such an approach might not and a person might reasonably reject a 
Rawlsian approach to fairness. 
Jan Jans’s article “Until the End Willed by God? Moral Theology and the 
Debate on ‘Euthanasia’ ” has the feel of a paper written in the mid-1980s at the height, 
arguably, of anti-Roman sentiment among Catholic theologians. Despite its frequent 
carping tone, it does raise some interesting issues that deserve comment. Jans detects 
7 Ibid., 128.
8 Ibid., 133.
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rival definitions of euthanasia in official magisterial statements, specifically two 
different definitions by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) in its 
Declaration on Euthanasia:
I would suggest that [there is] a certain tension between the first formula tion 
of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “an action or an omission 
which by itself or by intention causes death” and the second, “euthanasia’s 
terms of reference are to be found in the intention of the will and in the 
methods used.” There is no expla nation for this difference although it seems 
to be important in the application of the teaching: according to the first sen-
tence of the definition, euthanasia could occur under two forms: firstly as an 
action or an omission which of itself causes death and secondly as an action 
or an omission which by intention causes death. But if one reads the second 
sentence, both this intention and the methods used must be present in order 
to be able to speak of euthanasia.9 
On Jans’s view, we have, on the one hand, a disjunctive definition: to count as 
euthanasia there must be either an act (or omission) which by itself causes death or 
an intention to cause death. On the other hand, we have a conjunctive definition: to 
count as euthanasia there must be both an act (or omission) which by itself causes 
death and an intention to cause death.
However, when interpreted in a more charitable manner, the citation that Jans 
uses to establish the theory of two rival definitions does not seem to provide much 
support for the theory. The passage in which he finds two rival definitions reads, “By 
euthanasia is understood an action or an omission which of itself or by intention causes 
death, in order that all suffering may in this way be eliminated. Euthanasia’s terms 
of reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the will and in the methods 
used.” 10 In noting that two terms are used in the predicate of the definition, the declara-
tion is not supplying a rival definition but simply clarifying the principle elements of 
the only definition given. It is an implausible and captious reading to interpret the text 
as providing a rival definition in the very next sentence following the first definition. 
Jans also sees a tension between the CDF’s definition of euthanasia and the 
definition given by Pope St. John Paul II in Evangelium vitae, which states, “For a 
correct moral judgment on euthanasia, in the first place a clear definition is required. 
Euthanasia in the strict sense is understood to be an action or omission which of 
itself and by intention causes death, with the purpose of eliminating all suffering. 
‘Euthanasia’s terms of reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the will 
and in the methods used.’ ” 11 The footnote to this passage cites the CDF’s Declara-
tion on Euthanasia. Jans comments on this passage as follows:
Compared with the definition of 1980 given by the Sacred Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, the change is obvious since now in the first 
9 Jan Jans, “Until the End Willed by God? Moral Theology and the Debate on 
‘Euthanasia,’ ” Studies in Christian Ethics 24.4 (2011): 479.
10 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Euthanasia (May 5, 
1980), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_
doc_19800505_euthanasia_en.html.
11 John Paul II, Evangelium vitae (March 25, 1995), n. 65, emphasis added.
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 sentence of this definition in Evangelium vitae, the “or” between “of itself” 
and “by intention” has been substituted by “and.” Furthermore, that this is 
not a mistake can be demonstrated from the way the encyclical is referring 
to the text of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: only the 
last sentence on the terms of reference is a direct quotation from this Decla-
ration. It is worth pointing out that this kind of change comes to a degree as 
a sur prise: Evangelium vitae now teaches that in order to be able to make a 
moral judgement, both the intention of the will to cause death and the meth-
ods effectively doing so must be present. In the classical terminology of the 
so-called “sources of morality”—as used by the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church in §175014—this would mean that both the inten tion and the object 
of the act must be scrutinised in order to reach a moral conclusion.12
On Jans’s view, Evangelium vitae contradicts not only the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church but also the view expressed in Veritatis splendor that certain acts, such as eutha-
nasia, are intrinsically evil regardless of the intention with which they are performed.13 
Again, I think that a more charitable reading of the texts dissolves the alleged 
contradiction. Note that John Paul II speaks of “euthanasia in the strict sense” to 
qualify his remarks. We could distinguish euthanasia in the strict sense—one might 
say a paradigm case of euthanasia—from euthanasia in a broader, less paradigmatic 
sense. Similar differentiations take place with other moral acts that the tradition 
investigates. For example, one could hold with St. Augustine that lying in the strict 
sense, a paradigm case of lying, is speaking what you believe to be an untruth with 
the motivation of deception. This leaves open the possibility of a less paradigmatic 
case also counting as lying such as that held by Aquinas: speaking what you believe 
to be false regardless of the motivation of the act. 
The other part of Jans’s view, that Evangelium vitae contradicts the view 
expressed in Veritatis splendor in holding that “intention” is part of the definition 
of euthanasia, also can be resolved. One must distinguish between proximate and 
remote intentions. In condemning certain actions as intrinsically evil, Veritatis splen-
dor recognizes that some of these acts are partially constituted by their proximate 
intention. For example, for an act to be suicidal, the agent must be intending, either 
as a means or as a more remote end, his own death. A death in which this intention 
is lacking, such as jumping on a hand grenade to save colleagues who would other-
wise be killed, is not suicide. Likewise, euthanasia, in the strict sense mentioned in 
Evangelium vitae, involves the proximate intention to kill. There is nothing contra-
dictory in saying that acts such as these are intrinsically evil and therefore cannot 
be justified by any remote intention or motivation whatsoever. 
chrisTopher KAczor
12 Jans, “Until the End Willed by God?,” 480.
13 John Paul II, Veritatis splendor (August 6, 1993), n. 80. 
